Abstract. In a fuzzy cooperative game the players may choose to partially participate in a coalition. A fuzzy coalition consists of a group of participating players along with their participation level. The characteristic function of a fuzzy game specifies the worth of each such coalition. This paper introduces well-known properties of classical cooperative games to the theory of fuzzy games, and studies their interrelations. It deals with convex games, exact games, games with a large core, extendable games and games with a stable core.
Introduction
In the theory of classical TU cooperative games (classical games from now on), a characteristic function is defined over all the subsets of the set of players. The core of a classical game is the set of allocations which can not be blocked by any coalition (subset of players). Aubin (1979 Aubin ( , 1981a suggested to consider fuzzy coalitions as well, which are coalitions composed of different "fractions" of the various players. His hope was to achieve a refinement of the core by enlarging the set of constrains that a potential core allocation should satisfy.
There are two main justifications in the literature for the use of fuzzy coalitions. The first, suggested by Aubin himself, is that every player can choose his level of participation in a coalition, and not only whether to participate or not. This interpretation of fuzzy coalitions is especially appealing when each player has an endowment of some (divisible) private resource (time or money are two instances). In this case, a fuzzy coalition is merely a specification of the amount that each agent invests in the joint project.
The second justification is based on a 'large economy' argument (Husseinov, 1994) . Every finite economy is associated with an infinite non-atomic economy. An agent of the original finite economy is replaced by a continuum of identical agents. This gives a natural way to interpret the meaning of a fuzzy coalition in the finite economy. Indeed, a fuzzy coalition in the finite economy becomes an ordinary coalition in the infinite one. Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) use the relation between fuzzy coalitions of a finite economy and ordinary coalitions in a non-atomic economy in order to characterize market games originated in large economies.
It is quite surprising, therefore, that relatively little attention has been given to the study of fuzzy games
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. This is in contrast to the vast research in the theory of classical games. The purpose of this paper is to define and analyze some families of fuzzy games. The definition of each of these families is inspired by an analogous definition in the classical theory.
The families we discuss include convex games, exact games, games with a large core, extendable games and games with a stable core. The following diagram summarizes the inclusion relations between these families when classical games are considered (see Biswas et al., 1999 and van Gellekom et al., 1999) . In what follows TB attached to an arrow means that the relation holds only for totally balanced games. 
Cooperative games
Each of the aforementioned families of classical games has its natural counterpart family of fuzzy games. Convex fuzzy games were first studied by Tsurumi et al. (2001) . However, their definition of convexity of a fuzzy game is weaker than the one used in the current paper. Our definition is equivalent to the one used in Branzei et al. (2003) . Stable sets of fuzzy games were introduced by Tijs et al. (2004b) . The rest of the families are defined in this paper. It turns out that some relations between these families that hold true in classical games are no longer true in fuzzy games. New and somewhat surprising relations appear in this context. These are demonstrated in the following two diagrams.
convexity and exactness k s + 3 linearity k s + 3 exactness of every subgame Fuzzy games 1 
Fuzzy games 2
The fact that convexity implies that the core is stable is due to Tijs et al. (2004b) . The rest of the results are proved here.
Comparing the figures above, one can see significant differences between classical and fuzzy games. First, notice that every classical convex game is exact, while convexity does not imply exactness in fuzzy games. Moreover, the only fuzzy games which are both exact and convex are linear games. Second, for totally balanced classical games exactness is a strictly weaker property than either largeness of the core or extendability. However, in fuzzy games, exactness implies both largeness of the core and extendability (for totally balanced fuzzy games exactness and extendability are equivalent).
Another difference appears when considering games whose every sub-game is exact. In cooperative games such a property is equivalent to convexity, while in fuzzy games it is much stronger. The only fuzzy games which have this property are the linear games.
Fuzzy games
2.1. Basic definitions. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set. For every non-
The point Q is interpreted as the "grand coalition", and every c ∈ F (Q) is a possible (fuzzy) coalition. The support of a coalition c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ F (Q) is the set supp(c) = {i ∈ N ; c i > 0}. We denote by |c| the l 1 norm of c, that
We will also be interested in sub-games of a given fuzzy game. These are naturally defined as in the classical theory.
Definition 2. Let (Q, v) be a fuzzy game and fix some c ∈ F (Q). The subgame of (Q,v) with respect to c is the fuzzy game (c, v c ), where for every
We identify subsets of N with the corresponding extreme points of F (Q). 
2.2. Balanced and totally balanced games. We review here the definition of the core of a fuzzy game.
Definition 4. (Aubin 1979 (Aubin , 1981a The core of the fuzzy game (Q, v), denoted Core(Q, v) , is the set of vectors x ∈ R n such that
The Bondareva-Shapley theorem (Bondareva, 1963 and Shapley, 1967) shows that a classical game (Q, v) has a non-empty core iff it is balanced and that every sub-game of (Q, v) has a non-empty core iff (Q, v) is totally balanced. An analogous result for fuzzy games is given by Sharkey and Telser (1978) . In Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) there is a similar characterization, but the method of proof is different. For the sake of completeness, we state here the main result as it appears in Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) . This requires the following definition.
Definition 5. Fix a non-negative vector Q ∈ R n and let v : In the sequel, we keep the terminology used in the classical theory and say that (Q, v) is balanced if SSav(Q) = v(Q) and that it is totally balanced if v is Strongly Super-Additive.
Convex games
There are several possible ways to extend this definition to fuzzy games. In Branzei et al. (2003) a fuzzy game (Q, v) is said to be convex if it satisfies the following two properties: 2 for two vectors z, w ∈ R n , zw denotes the inner product; i.e., zw
The function v is coordinate-wise convex on F (Q). That is, for any i ∈ N and for every
We choose to define convexity of a fuzzy game in a slightly different way, which seems to us more natural. Like in Shapley's definition, the idea is that the marginal contribution of any coalition is increasing. Branzei et al. (2003) show that their definition implies ours (see Proposition 4 there). It is not hard to see that the converse is also true.
Definition 6. The fuzzy game (Q, v) is convex if, whenever s, t, d and t + d are coalitions such that s ≤ t, it follows that v(s
An important property of convex classical games is that they are balanced (and, of course, totally balanced as sub-games of a convex game are also convex). Branzei et al. (2003) show that this is true for convex fuzzy games as well. Moreover, when (Q, v) is convex, Core (Q, v) coincides with the core of the (convex) classical game (N,v) (in their paper it is assumed that all the coordinates of Q equal 1). Other properties and characterizations of convex games can be found in Tijs and Branzei (2004a) .
In this section we discuss other properties of convex fuzzy games that, to the best of our knowledge, have not appeared elsewhere. The first question which arises is whether convexity of the fuzzy game (Q, v) is equivalent to convexity of v as a function on F (Q). The following proposition provides the answer.
Proposition 1. (i) If n = 1 then convexity of v on [0, Q] is equivalent to convexity of the game (Q, v). (ii) For n ≥ 2, convexity of v on F (Q) does not imply and is not implied by convexity of the game (Q, v).
Proof. (i) This is a consequence of the equivalence of our definition and that of Branzei et al. (2003) .
(ii) We start with an example where the game
On the other hand, let Q = (2, 2) and define
It is clear that any sub-game of a convex fuzzy game is convex. Thus, any convex fuzzy game is totally balanced. Theorem 1 implies that if (Q, v) is convex, then v is Strongly Super-Additive. A natural question is whether the converse, namely whether Strong Super-Additivity implies convexity, is correct. The following example shows that the answer is no.
To check that (Q, v) as well as each one of its sub-games has a non-empty core define for every
c ∈ F (Q) the vector x(c) ∈ IR n by x(c) i = v(c) |c| , i = 1, . . . , n. A simple computation shows that, for any c ∈ F (Q), x(c) ∈ Core(c, v c ).
Thus, v is Strongly Super-Additive on F (Q). However, (Q, v) is not a convex game since the function v is not coordinate-wise convex.
We move on to discuss continuity of convex fuzzy games. By Proposition 1, convexity of (Q, v) does not imply that v is a convex function. Therefore, a matter of interest is whether convexity of (Q, v) guarantees continuity of v on F (Q). The following example shows that, in general, convex games need not be continuous on the boundary of F (Q).
Example 2. Let Q = (1, . . . , 1) be the n-dimensional unit vector. 
Theorem 2. (i) A convex fuzzy game is continuous in the interior of F (Q). (ii) If a convex fuzzy game is continuous in 0 and Q, then it is continuous in F (Q).
Proof. The result in (i) can be easily derived from the fact that the characteristic function v of a convex game is coordinate-wise convex (see Rockafellar, 1997 , page 89, Theorem 10.7).
As for (ii), notice first that (i) ensures that v is continuous in the relative interior of every facet. The proof of (ii) is by induction on the dimension of the game, n. For n = 1 the assertion is trivial. Assume that (ii) holds for every game of dimension less than n and we prove the assertion for n.
Let F be a facet of F (Q). There are c and d such that F = {e; c ≤ e ≤ d}. In order to show continuity of v in F it is enough to show continuity of v in c and d. Let e be a coalition such that c + e ∈ F . Due to convexity of (Q, v),
However, if |e| is sufficiently small, then both sides of (1) The proof is similar when q = c ∨ d is in the boundary. We conclude that v is continuous, as required.
Exact games
A classical game is called exact (Schmeidler, 1972) if for every coalition there is a core member which gives this coalition exactly its worth. This definition naturally extends to fuzzy games.
The following theorem characterizes exact games.
Theorem 3. A fuzzy game (Q, v) is exact iff the following conditions hold:
(
for any c ∈ F (Q) and for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Assume that (1)- (3) hold. Since v is homogeneous we can assume w.l.o.g. that ∆ ⊆ F (Q). For any q ∈ ∆ denote by q −n the (n − 1) dimensional vector consisting of the first n − 1 coordinates of q. Thus, the n-th coordinate of q, q n is equal to 1 − |q −n |.
The set L is the line connecting (c −n , v(c)) and ((
It is a convex set in R n , and since v is concave, D is also a convex set. Furthermore, the interior of D is not empty.
Fix β ∈ (0, 1) and let α ∈ (0, 1) be such that β = (2) and (3),
The above equality implies that the sets D and L are disjoint. Moreover, the line segment L is on the boundary of D. The separation theorem ensures that there is a hyperplane in R n that separates L from D, and since L is on the boundary of D, it follows that L is contained in this hyperplane. This implies that there is a vector x ∈ R n such that x = 0 and xq ≥ v(q) for every q ∈ ∆ with equality for every q ∈ L. In particular x ∈ Core(Q, v) and xc = v(c). Finally, exactness of (Q, v) follows from homogeneity of v on F (Q).
As for the converse, assume that (Q, v) is exact. Let c, d ∈ F (Q) and fix
Next, we show that v is homogeneous. Fix c ∈ F (Q) and α > 0 such that αc ∈ F (Q). Let x, y ∈ Core(Q, v) be such that xc = v(c) and yαc = v(αc).
Since both x and y are in the core, xc = v(c) ≤ yc and αxc ≥ v(αc) = αyc. It follows that v(αc) = αv(c).
Finally, for some c ∈ F (Q) and α ∈ (0, 1), let x, y ∈ Core (Q, v) 
be such that xc = v(c) and y(αc+(1−α)Q) = v(αc+(1−α)Q). Then αv(c)+(1−α)v(Q)
= αxc + (1 − α)xQ ≥ v(αc + (1 − α)Q) = αyc + (1 − α)yQ ≥ αv(c) + (1 − α)v(Q),
Remark 2. Aubin (1981b, section 5) studies fuzzy games whose characteristic function is homogeneous and super-additive (and thus concave) on the entire non-negative orthant. Such characteristic function is the point-wise minimum of a set of linear functions, but the restriction of it to some compact cube may not result in an exact game. This is because condition (3) of Theorem 3 is not necessarily satisfied.
It is well known that the vector of marginal contributions (with respect to any order of the players) of a convex cooperative game is in the core. This fact implies that every convex game is exact. A consequence of Theorem 3 is that this is not the case for fuzzy games. In fact, it turns out that a fuzzy game is both convex and exact if and only if it is linear, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A fuzzy game (Q, v) is both exact and convex iff there is
Proof. First, it is trivial that if v(c) = xc for some x ∈ R n then (Q, v) is convex and exact. Conversely, assume that (Q, v) is both exact and convex. Fix a coalition c = Q with full support. For every c ∈ F (Q) there is α > 0 such that αc ∈ F (c). Since (Q, v) is exact it is homogeneous and, thus, it is enough to show that the sub-game (c, v c ) is linear.
By exactness, there is
(c) which contradicts the convexity of (Q, v).
Our next goal is to characterize fuzzy games with the property that each one of their sub-games is exact. It turns out that a fuzzy game with such a property is linear. Note that this result stands in strict contrast with the situation in the classical theory where exactness of every sub-game is equivalent to convexity (Biswas et al., 1999, page 10) . We first need the following lemma. Proof. Since (Q, v) is exact, by Theorem 3, v is a homogenous function on F (Q). Thus, in order to prove the lemma, it is enough to prove that v is linear in ∆ (as in the previous proof, one can assume that ∆ ⊆ F (Q)).
We first claim that for every i = 1, . . . , n and for every d ∈ ∆, v is linear in the interval between 
Since v is homogenous the righthand side of the latter equality is equal to are in ∆, the sum of the coefficients is 1. From here on the proof follows an induction on the number of negative coefficients. If this number is 0, then d ∈ C, a case that has been considered above. Now suppose that if the number of negative coefficients is less than
Next we show that v(
). We prove this assertion when the number of negative coefficients is k.
We know that for every j = 1, . . . , n and β ∈ (0, 1), v(β
However, if γ j < 0 and β is sufficiently close to 1, the number of negative coefficients of β
Thus, when β is sufficiently close to 1, βv(
). By rearranging the last equality,
), as desired.
Theorem 4. Every sub-game of a fuzzy game (Q, v) is exact iff v is a linear function on F (Q).
Proof. From the previous lemma it follows that if every sub-game of a fuzzy game (Q, v) is exact, then v is a linear function on F (Q). The converse is trivially true.
Large cores
The concept of a large core in the classical theory was first introduced by Sharkey (1982) . The classical game (N, v) has a large core if, for every vector y ∈ R n with y(S) ≥ v(S) for every S ⊆ N , there is a core member x such that x ≤ y. His definition (with the necessary minor changes) is suitable for fuzzy games as well. We are interested in the relations between the family of games with a large core and the families defined in the previous sections. In the classical theory every convex game has a large core, while the converse is false (Sharkey, 1982) . Also, if a totally balanced game has a large core then it is exact (Sharkey, 1982) . The converse is false (Biswas et al., 1999) .
For fuzzy games, the relations between the various families change. First, we show that every exact fuzzy game has a large core while the converse is false even for totally balanced games. This stands in contrast to the classical games case. The proof of the theorem uses the following lemma, proved in Azrieli and Lehrer (2005) . As in the classical theory, convexity implies largeness of the core, as stated in the following theorem. Proof. Let (Q, v) be a convex game. Denote by E the unit vector in R n (that is, Branzei et al. (2003, Proposition 2) , the induced classical game (N,v) is convex. Therefore, (N,v) has a large core (Sharkey, 1982) . It follows that there is x ≤ y in the core of (N,v). By Branzei et al. (2003, Theorem 7) , Core(N,v) = Core (E, v) , so x ∈ Core (E, v) . Now, let Q be arbitrary. Define the auxiliary game (E, v ) by v (c) = v (Q 1 c 1 , . . . , Q n c n ) for every c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) ∈ F (E). It is straightforward to check that (E, v ) is convex and, thus, has a large core. If
Then it is easy to check that x ≤ y and x ∈ Core (Q, v) .
To see that the converse is false, consider the game (Q, v) of Example 1. Although (Q, v) is not convex it has a large core. Indeed, if yc ≥ v(c) for every c ∈ F (Q) then in particular y i ≥ 1 for every i = 1, . . . , n. This is because one can consider the coalition which equals 1 in its i coordinate and 0 elsewhere. Thus, the vector x ∈ IR n which equals 1 in all of its coordinates satisfies x ≤ y and x ∈ Core(Q, v).
Extendability
Let (Q, v) be a fuzzy game and let S be a subset of N . We denote by Core S (Q, v) the projection of Core (Q, v) The concept of extendability in cooperative games is due to Kikuta and Shapley (1986) . In classical games it is known that extendability is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for core stability. Moreover, for totally balanced games, largeness of the core implies extendability which, in turn, implies exactness. The converse of each of these statements is false. In fuzzy games, however, the situation is different. The next theorem shows that for totally balanced fuzzy games exactness and extendability are equivalent. In addition, we may assume w.l.o.g. that c is an interior point of F (Q S ). Otherwise, we can consider the coalition δc for some 0 < δ < 1. By homogeneity, the cores of (c, v c ) and (δc, v δc ) are equal.
The set Core S (Q, v) is closed and convex. Exactness implies that v is concave on F (Q S ). Moreover, since (Q, v) is exact the hyperplanes defined by the elements of Core S (Q, v) support the entire graph of v restricted to F (Q S ). Thus, we may apply Lemma 2 and conclude that x ∈ Core S (Q, v).
It is known (Biswas et al., 1999) 
stable cores
Stable sets for cooperative games had been extensively studied. One of the most challenging tasks in this subject is to characterize the family of games with a stable core. Many sufficient conditions for core stability are known, but none of them is also necessary.
Stable sets for fuzzy games were first introduced by Tijs et al. (2004b) . Their definition of a stable set for a fuzzy game is analogous to the one in classical cooperative games. They prove that the core of a convex fuzzy game is stable.
Here, we prove that exactness is also sufficient for core stability in fuzzy games. The proof is based on the fact that in fuzzy games exactness implies extendability, in contrast to the situation in cooperative games. For completeness, we repeat the definition of a stable set for a fuzzy game.
An imputation for the fuzzy game (Q, v) is a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that xQ = v(Q) and x i Q i ≥ v(Q {i} i ) for every i ∈ N . The set of all imputations of (Q, v) is denoted by I (Q, v) . For x, y ∈ I(Q, v) and a coalition c ∈ F (Q), we say that x dominates y via c (denoted x c y) if xc ≤ v(c) and x i > y i for every i ∈ supp(c). We say that x dominates y (denoted x y) if there exist c ∈ F (Q) such that x c y.
Definition 10. The set of imputations D ⊆ I(Q, v) is stable if the following two conditions hold:

